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Abstract
Motivated by safety-critical applications, test-time attacks on classifiers via adversar-
ial examples has recently received a great deal of attention. However, there is a general
lack of understanding on why adversarial examples arise; whether they originate due to
inherent properties of data or due to lack of training samples remains ill-understood.
In this work, we introduce a theoretical framework analogous to bias-variance theory
for understanding these effects. We use our framework to analyze the robustness of
a canonical non-parametric classifier – the k-nearest neighbors. Our analysis shows
that its robustness properties depend critically on the value of k – the classifier may
be inherently non-robust for small k, but its robustness approaches that of the Bayes
Optimal classifier for fast-growing k. We propose a novel modified 1-nearest neighbor
classifier, and guarantee its robustness in the large sample limit. Our experiments
suggest that this classifier may have good robustness properties even for reasonable
data set sizes.
1 Introduction
Machine learning is increasingly applied in security-critical domains such as automotive
systems, healthcare, finance and robotics. To ensure safe deployment in these applications,
there is an increasing need to design machine-learning algorithms that are robust in the
presence of adversarial attacks.
A realistic attack paradigm that has received a lot of recent attention [12, 26, 28, 25] is
test-time attacks via adversarial examples. Here, an adversary has the ability to provide
modified test inputs to an already-trained classifier, but cannot modify the training process
in any way. Their goal is to perturb legitimate test inputs by a “small amount” in order to
force the classifier to report an incorrect label. An example is an adversary that replaces a
stop sign by a slightly defaced version in order to force an autonomous vehicle to recognize
it as an yield sign. This attack is undetectable to the human eye if the perturbation is small
enough.
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Prior work has considered adversarial examples in the context of linear classifiers [19],
kernel SVMs [3] and neural networks [28, 12, 25, 26, 22]. However, most of this work has
either been empirical, or has focussed on developing theoretically motivated attacks and
defenses. Consequently, there is a general lack of understanding on why adversarial examples
arise; whether they originate due to inherent properties of data or due to lack of training
samples remains ill-understood.
This work develops a theoretical framework for robust learning in order to understand the
effects of distributional properties and finite samples on robustness. Building on traditional
bias-variance theory [10], we posit that a classification algorithm may be robust to adversarial
examples due to three reasons. First, it may be distributionally robust, in the sense that the
output classifier is robust as the number of training samples grow to infinity. Second, even
the output of a distributionally robust classification algorithm may be vulnerable due to too
few training samples – this is characterized by finite sample robustness. Finally, different
training algorithms might result in classifiers with different degrees of robustness, which we
call algorithmic robustness. These quantities are analogous to bias, variance and algorithmic
effects respectively.
Next, we analyze a simple non-parametric classification algorithm: k-nearest neighbors in
our framework. Our analysis demonstrates that large sample robustness properties of this
algorithm depend very much on k.
Specifically, we identify two distinct regimes for k with vastly different robustness
properties. When k is constant, we show that k-nearest neighbors has zero robustness in
the large sample limit in regions where p(y = 1|x) lies in (0, 1). This is in contrast with
accuracy, which may be quite high in these regions. For k = Ω(
√
dn log n), where d is the
data dimension and n is the sample size, we show that the robustness region of k-nearest
neighbors approaches that of the Bayes Optimal classifier in the large sample limit. This is
again in contrast with accuracy, where convergence to the Bayes Optimal accuracy is known
for a much slower growing k [7, 5].
Since k = Ω(
√
dn log n) is too high to use in practice with nearest neighbors, we next
propose a novel robust version of the 1-nearest neighbor classifier that operates on a modified
training set. We provably show that in the large sample limit, this algorithm has superior
robustness to standard 1-nearest neighbors for data distributions with certain properties.
Finally, we validate our theoretical results by empirically evaluating our algorithm on
three datasets against several popular attacks. Our experiments demonstrate that our
algorithm performs better than or about as well as both standard 1-nearest neighbors and
nearest neighbors with adversarial training – a popular and effective defense mechanism.
This suggests that although our performance guarantees hold in the large sample limit, our
algorithm may have good robustness properties even for realistic training data sizes.
1.1 Related Work
Adversarial examples have recently received a great deal of attention [12, 3, 26, 28, 25].
Most of the work, however, has been empirical, and has focussed on developing increasingly
sophisticated attacks and defenses.
1.1.1 Related Work on Adversarial Examples
Prior theoretical work on adversarial examples falls into two categories – analysis and theory-
inspired defenses. Work on analysis includes [9], which analyzes the robustness of linear and
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quadratic classifiers under random and semi-random perturbations. [13] provides robustness
guarantees on linear and kernel classifiers trained on a given data set. [11] shows that linear
classifiers for high dimensional datasets may have inherent robustness-accuracy trade-offs.
Work on theory-inspired defenses include [20, 15, 1], who provide defense mechanisms for
adversarial examples in neural networks that are relaxations of certain principled optimization
objectives. [14] shows how to use program verification to certify robustness of neural networks
around given inputs for small neural networks.
Our work differs from these in two important ways. First, unlike most prior work which
looks at a given training dataset, we consider effects of the data distribution and number of
samples, and analyze robustness properties in the large sample limit. Second, unlike prior
work which largely focuses on parametric methods such as neural networks, our focus is on a
canonical non-parametric method – the nearest neighbors classifier.
1.1.2 Related Work on Nearest Neighbors
There has been a body of work on the convergence and consistency of nearest-neighbor
classifiers and their many variants [6, 27, 17, 8, 5, 16]; all these works however consider
accuracy and not robustness.
In the asymptotic regime, [6] shows that the accuracy of 1-nearest neighbors converges in
the large sample limit to 1− 2R∗(1−R∗) where R∗ is the error rate of the Bayes Optimal
classifier. This implies that even 1-nearest neighbor may achieve relatively high accuracy
even when p(y = 1|x) is not 0 or 1. In contrast, we show that 1-nearest neighbor is inherently
non-robust when p(y = 1|x) ∈ (0, 1) under some continuity conditions.
For larger k, the accuracy of k-nearest neighbors is known to converge to that of the
Bayes Optimal classifier if kn →∞ and kn/n→ 0 as the sample size n→∞. We show that
the robustness also converges to that of the Bayes Optimal classifier when kn grows at a
much higher rate – fast enough to ensure uniform convergence. Whether this high rate is
necessary remains an intriguing open question.
Finite sample rates on the accuracy of nearest neighbors are known to depend heavily on
properties of the data distribution, and there is no distribution free rate as in parametric
methods [8]. [5] provides a clean characterization of the finite sample rates of nearest
neighbors as a function of natural interiors of the classes. Here we build on their results
by defining a stricter, more robust version of interiors and providing bounds as functions of
these new robust quantities.
1.1.3 Other Related Work
[2] provides a method for generating adversarial examples for nearest neighbors, and shows
that the effectiveness of attacks grow with intrinsic dimensionality. Finally, [24, 25] provides
black-box attacks on substitute classifiers; their experiments show that attacks from other
types of substitute classifiers are not successful on nearest neighbors; our experiments
corroborate these results.
3
2 The Setting and Definitions
2.1 The Basic Setup
We consider test-time attacks in a white box setting, where the adversary has full knowledge
of the training process – namely, the type of classifier used, the training data and any
parameters – but cannot modify training in any way.
Given an input x, the adversary’s goal is to perturb it so as to force the trained classifier
f to report a different label than f(x). The amount of perturbation is measured by an
application-specific metric d, and is constrained to be within a radius r. Our analysis can
be extended to any metric, but for this paper we assume that d is the Euclidean distance
for mathematical simplicity; we also focus on binary classification, and leave extensions to
multiclass for future work.
Finally, we assume that unlabeled instances are drawn from an instance space X , and
their labels are drawn from the label space {0, 1}. There is an underlying data distribution
D that generates labeled examples; the marginal over X of D is µ and the conditional
distribution of labels given x is denoted by η.
2.2 Robustness and astuteness
We begin by defining robustness, which for a classifier f at input x is measured by the
robustness radius.
Definition 2.1 (Robustness Radius). The robustness radius of a classifier f at an instance
x ∈ X , denoted by ρ(f, x), is the shortest distance between x and an input x′ to which f
assigns a label different from f(x):
ρ(f, x) = inf
r
{∃x′ ∈ X ∩B(x, r) s.t f(x) 6= f(x′)}
Observe that the robustness radius measures a classifier’s local robustness. A classifier
f with robustness radius r at x guarantees that no adversarial example of x with norm
of perturbation less than r can be created using any attack method. A plausible way
to extend this into a global notion is to require a lower bound on the robustness radius
everywhere; however, only the constant classifier will satisfy this condition. Instead, we
consider robustness around meaningful instances, that we model as examples drawn from
the underlying data distribution.
Definition 2.2 (Robustness with respect to a Distribution). The robustness of a classifier
f at radius r with respect to a distribution µ over the instance space X , denoted by R(f, r, µ),
is the fraction of instances drawn from µ for which the robustness radius is greater than or
equal to r.
R(f, r, µ) = Pr
x∼µ(ρ(f, x) ≥ r)
Finally, observe that we are interested in classifiers that are both robust and accurate.
This leads to the notion of astuteness, which measures the fraction of instances on which a
classifier is both accurate and robust.
Definition 2.3 (astuteness). The astuteness of a classifier f with respect to a data distribu-
tion D and a radius r is the fraction of examples on which it is accurate and has robustness
radius at least r; formally,
AstD(f, r) = Pr
(x,y)∼D
(ρ(f, x) ≥ r, f(x) = y),
4
Observe that astuteness is analogous to classification accuracy, and we argue that it is
a more appropriate metric if we are concerned with both robustness and accuracy. Unlike
accuracy, astuteness cannot be directly empirically measured unless we have a way to certify
a lower bound on the robustness radius. In this work, we will prove bounds on the astuteness
of classifiers, and in our experiments, we will approximate it by measuring resistance to
standard attacks.
2.3 Sources of Robustness
There are three plausible reasons why classifiers lack robustness – distributional, finite sample
and algorithmic. These sources are analogous to bias, variance, and algorithmic effects
respectively in standard bias-variance theory.
Distributional robustness measures the effect of the data distribution on robustness
when an infinitely large number of samples are used to train the classifier. Formally, if
Sn is a training sample of size n drawn from D and A(Sn, ·) is a classifier obtained by
applying the training procedure A on Sn, then the distributional robustness at radius r is
limn→∞ ESn∼D[R(A(Sn, ·), r, µ)].
In contrast, for finite sample robustness, we characterize the behaviour of R(A(Sn, ·), r, µ)
for finite n – usually by putting high probability bounds over the training set. Thus, finite
sample robustness depends on the training set size n, and quantifies how it changes with
sample size. Finally, robustness also depends on the training algorithm itself; for example,
some variants of nearest neighbors may have higher robustness than nearest neighbors itself.
2.4 Nearest Neighbor and Bayes Optimal Classifiers
Given a training set Sn = {(X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn)} and a test example x, we use the notation
X(i)(x) to denote the i-th nearest neighbor of x in Sn, and Y (i)(x) to denote the label of
X(i)(x).
Given a test example x, the k-nearest neighbor classifier Ak(Sn, x) outputs:
= 1, if Y (1)(x) + . . .+ Y (k)(x) ≥ k/2
= 0, otherwise.
The Bayes optimal classifier g over a data distribution D has the following classification
rule:
g(x) =
{
1 if η(x) = Pr(y = 1|x) ≥ 1/2;
0 otherwise. (1)
3 Robustness of Nearest Neighbors
How robust is the k-nearest neighbor classifier? We show that it depends on the value of k.
Specifically, we identify two distinct regimes – constant k and k = Ω(
√
dn log n) where d is
the data dimension – and show that nearest neighbors has different robustness properties in
the two.
3.1 Low k Regime
In this region, k is a constant that does not depend on the training set size n. Provided
certain regularity conditions hold, we show that k-nearest neighbors is inherently non-robust
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in this regime unless η(x) ∈ {0, 1} – in the sense that the distributional robustness becomes
0 in the large sample limit.
Theorem 3.1. Let x ∈ X ∩ supp(µ) such that (a) µ is absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure (b) η(x) ∈ (0, 1) (c) η is continuous with respect to the Euclidean
metric in a neighborhood of x. Then, for fixed k, ρ(Ak(Sn, ·), x) converges in probability to
0.
Remarks. Observe that Theorem 3.1 implies that the distributional robustness (and hence
astuteness) in a region where η(x) ∈ (0, 1) is 0. This is in contrast with accuracy; for 1-NN,
the accuracy converges to 1 − 2R∗(1 − R∗) as n → ∞, where R∗ is the error rate of the
Bayes Optimal classifier, and thus may be quite high.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 in the Appendix shows that the absolute continuity of µ with
respect to the Lebesgue measure is not strictly necessary; absolute continuity with respect
to an embedded manifold will give the same result, but will result in a more complex proof.
In the Appendix A (Theorem A.2), we show that k-nearest neighbor is astute in the
interior of the region where η ∈ {0, 1}, and provide finite sample rates for this case.
3.2 High k Regime
Prior work has shown that in the large sample limit, the accuracy of the nearest neighbor
classifiers converge to the Bayes Optimal, provided k is set properly. We next show that
if k is Ω(
√
dn log n), the regions of robustness and the astuteness of the k nearest neighbor
classifiers also approach the corresponding quantities for the Bayes Optimal classifier as
n→∞. Thus, if the Bayes Optimal classifier is robust, then so is k-nearest neighbors in the
large sample limit.
The main intuition is that k = Ω(
√
dn log n) is large enough for uniform convergence –
where, with high probability, all Euclidean balls with k examples have the property that the
empirical averages of their labels are close to their expectations. This guarantees that for
any x, the k-nearest neighbor reports the same label as the Bayes Optimal classifier for all
x′ close to x. Thus, if the Bayes Optimal classifier is robust, so is nearest neighbors.
3.2.1 Definitions
We begin with some definitions that we can use to characterize the robustness of the Bayes
Optimal classifier. Following [5], we use the notation Bo(x, r) to denote an open ball and
B(x, r) to denote a closed ball of radius r around x. We define the probability radius of a
ball around x as:
rp(x) = inf{r | µ(B(x, r)) ≥ p}
We next define the r-robust (p,∆)-strict interiors as follows:
X+r,∆,p = {x ∈ supp(µ) | ∀x′ ∈ Bo(x, r),
∀x′′ ∈ B(x′, rp(x′)), η(x′′) > 1/2 + ∆}
X−r,∆,p = {x ∈ supp(µ) | ∀x′ ∈ Bo(x, r),
∀x′′ ∈ B(x′, rp(x′)), η(x′′) < 1/2−∆}
What is the significance of these interiors? Let x′ be an instance such that all x′′ ∈
B(x′, rp(x′)) have η(x′′) > 1/2 + ∆. If p ≈ kn , then the k points x′′ closest to x′ have
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η(x′′) > 1/2 + ∆. Provided the average of the labels of these points is close to expectation,
which happens when k is large relative to 1/∆, k-nearest neighbor outputs label 1 on x′.
When x is in the r-robust (p,∆)-strict interior region X+r,∆,p, this is true for all x′ within
distance r of x, which means that k-nearest neighbors will be robust at x. Thus, the r-robust
(p,∆)-strict interior is the region where we natually expect k-nearest neighbor to have
robustness radius r, when k is large relative to 1∆ and p ≈ kn .
Readers familiar with [5] will observe that the set of all x′ for which ∀x′′ ∈ B(x′, rp(x′)), η(x′′) >
1/2 + ∆ forms a stricter version of the (p,∆)-interiors of the 1 region that was defined in
this work; these x′ also represent the region where k-nearest neighbors are accurate when
k ≈ max(np, 1/∆2). The r-robust (p,∆)-strict interior is thus a somewhat stricter and more
robust version of this definition.
3.2.2 Main Results
We begin by characterizing where the Bayes Optimal classifier is robust.
Theorem 3.2. The Bayes Optimal classifier has robustness radius r at x ∈ X+r,0,0 ∪ X−r,0,0.
Moreover, its astuteness is E[η(x)1(x ∈ X+r,0,0)] + E[(1− η(x))1(x ∈ X−r,0,0)].
The proof is in the Appendix, along with analogous results for astuteness. The following
theorem, along with a similar result for astuteness, proved in the Appendix, characterizes
robustness in the large k regime.
Theorem 3.3. For any n, pick a δ and a ∆n → 0. There exist constant C1 and C2 such that
if kn ≥ C1
√
dn logn+n log(1/δn)
∆n
, and pn ≥ knn (1 + C2
√
d logn+log(1/δ)
kn
), then, with probability
≥ 1− 3δ, kn-NN has robustness radius r in x ∈ X+r,∆n,pn ∪ X−r,∆n,pn .
Remarks. Some remarks are in order. First, observe that as n → ∞, ∆n and pn tend
to 0; thus, provided certain continuity conditions hold, X+r,∆n,pn ∪ X−r,∆n,pn approaches
X+r,0,0 ∪ X−r,0,0, the robustness region of the Bayes Optimal classifier.
Second, observe that as r-robust strict interiors extend the definition of interiors in [5],
Theorem 3.3 is a robustness analogue of Theorem 5 in this work. Unlike the latter, Theo-
rem 3.3 has a more stringent requirement on k. Whether this is necessary is left as an open
question for future work.
4 A Robust 1-NN Algorithm
Section 3 shows that nearest neighbors is robust for k as large as Ω(
√
dn log n). However,
this k is too high to use in practice – high values of k require even higher sample sizes [5],
and lead to higher running times. Thus a natural question is whether we can find a more
robust version of the algorithm for smaller k. In this section, we provide a more robust
version of 1-nearest neighbors, and analytically demonstrate its robustness.
Our algorithm is motivated by the observation that 1-nearest neighbor is robust when
oppositely labeled points are far apart, and when test points lie close to training data. Most
training datasets however contain nearby points that are oppositely labeled; thus, we propose
to remove a subset of training points to enforce this property.
Which points should we remove? A plausible approach is to keep the largest subset where
oppositely labeled points are far apart; however, this subset has poor stability properties
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even for large n. Therefore, we propose to keep all points x such that: (a) we are highly
confident about the label of x and its nearby points and (b) all points close to x have the
same label. Given that all such x are kept, we remove as few points as possible, and execute
nearest neighbors on the remaining dataset.
The following definition characterizes data where oppositely labeled points are far apart.
Definition 4.1 (r-separated set). A set A = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} of labeled examples is
said to be r-separated if for all pairs (xi, yi), (xj , yj) ∈ A, ‖xi − xj‖ ≤ r implies yi = yj.
The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Given confidence
parameters ∆ and δ, Algorithm 2 returns a 0/1 label when this label agrees with the average
of kn points closest to x; otherwise, it returns ⊥. kn is chosen such that with probability
≥ 1− δ, the empirical majority of kn labels agrees with the majority in expectation, provided
the latter is at least ∆ away from 12 .
Algorithm 2 is used to determine whether an xi should be kept. Let f(xi) be the output
of Algorithm 2 on xi. If yi = f(xi) and if for all xj ∈ B(xi, r), f(xi) = f(xj) = yi, then
we mark xi as red. Finally, we compute the largest r-separated subset of the training data
that includes all the red points; this reduces to a constrained matching problem as in [16].
The resulting set, returned by Algorithm 1, is our new training set. We observe that this
set is r-separated from Lemma B.2 in the Appendix, and thus oppositely labeled points are
far apart. Moreover, we keep all (xi, yi) when we are confident about the label of xi and
its nearby points. Observe that our final procedure is a 1-NN algorithm, even though kn
neighbors are used to determine if a point should be retained in the training set.
Algorithm 1 Robust_1NN(Sn, r, ∆, δ, x)
for (xi, yi) ∈ Sn do
f(xi) = Confident-Label(Sn,∆, δ, xi)
end for
SRED = ∅
for (xi, yi) ∈ Sn do
if f(xi) = yi and f(xi) = f(xj) for all xj such that ‖xi − xj‖ ≤ r and (xj , yj) ∈ Sn
then
SRED = SRED
⋃{(xi, yi)}
end if
end for
Let S′ be the largest r-separated subset of Sn that contains all points in SRED.
return new training set S′
Algorithm 2 Confident-Label(Sn, ∆, δ, x)
kn = 3 log(2n/δ)/∆
2
y¯ = (1/kn)
∑kn
i=1 Y
(i)(x)
if y¯ ∈ [ 12 −∆, 12 + ∆] then
return ⊥
else
return 12sgn(y¯ − 12 ) + 12
end if
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4.1 Performance Guarantees
The following theorem establishes performance guarantees for Algorithm 1.
Theorem 4.2. Pick a ∆n and δ, and set kn = 3 log(2n/δ)/∆2n. Pick a margin parameter
τ . Then, there exist constants C and C0 such that the following hold. If we set pn =
kn
n (1 + C
√
d logn+log(1/δ)
kn
), and define the set:
XR =
{
x
∣∣∣x ∈ X+r+τ,∆n,pn ∪ X−r+τ,∆n,pn ,
µ(B(x, τ)) ≥ 2C0
n
(d log n+ log(1/δ))
}
Then, with probability ≥ 1− 2δ over the training set, Algorithm 1 run with parameters r, ∆n
and δ has robustness radius at least r − 2τ on XR.
Remarks. The proof is in the Appendix, along with an analogous result for astuteness.
Observe that XR is roughly the high density subset of the r + τ -robust strict interior
X+r+τ,∆n,pn ∪ X−r+τ,∆n,pn . Since η(x) is constrained to be greater than 12 + ∆n or less than
1
2 −∆n in this region, as opposed to 0 or 1, this is an improvement over standard nearest
neighbors when the data distribution has a large high density region that intersects with the
interiors.
A second observation is that as τ is an arbitrary constant, we can set to it be quite small
and still satisfy the condition on µ(B(x, τ)) for a large fraction of x’s when n is very large.
This means that in the large sample limit, r − 2τ may be close to r and XR may be close to
the high density subset of X+r,∆n,pn ∪ X−r,∆n,pn for a lot of smooth distributions.
5 Experiments
The results in Section 4 assume large sample limits. Thus, a natural question is how well
Algorithm 1 performs with more reasonable amounts of training data. We now empirically
investigate this question.
Since there are no general methods that certify robustness at an input, we assess
robustness by measuring how our algorithm performs against a suite of standard attack
methods. Specifically, we consider the following questions:
1. 1. How does our algorithm perform against popular white box and black box attacks
compared with standard baselines?
2. 2. How is performance affected when we change the training set size relative to the
data dimension?
These questions are considered in the context of three datasets with varying training set
sizes relative to the dimension, as well as two standard white box attacks and black box
attacks with two kinds of substitute classifiers.
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Figure. 1: White Box Attacks: Plot of classification accuracy on adversarial examples v.s.
attack radius. Top row: Direct Attack. Bottom row: Kernel Substitute Attack. Left to right:
1) Halfmoon, 2) MNIST 1v 7 and 3) Abalone.
Figure. 2: Black Box Attacks: Plot of classification accuracy on adversarial examples v.s.
attack radius. Top to Bottom: 1) kernel substitute, 2) neural net substitute. Left to right:
1) Halfmoon, 2) MNIST 1 v.s. 7 and 3) Abalone.
5.1 Methodology
5.1.1 Data
We use three datasets – Halfmoon, MNIST 1v7 and Abalone – with differing data sizes
relative to dimension. Halfmoon is a popular 2-dimensional synthetic data set for non-linear
classification. We use a training set of size 2000 and a test set of size 1000 generated with
standard deviation σ = 0.2. The MNIST 1v7 data set is a subset of the 784-dimensional
MNIST data. For training, we use 1000 images each of Digit 1 and 7, and for test, 500 images
of each digit. Finally, for the Abalone dataset [18], our classification task is to distinguish
whether an abalone is older than 10.5 years based on 7 physical measurements. For training,
we use 500 and for test, 100 samples. In addition, a validation set with the same size as the
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test set is generated for each experiment for parameter tuning.
5.1.2 Baselines
We compare Algorithm 1, denoted by RobustNN, against three baselines. The first is
the standard 1-nearest neighbor algorithm, denoted by StandardNN. We use two forms
of adversarially-trained nearest neighbors - ATNN and ATNN-all. Let S be the training
set used by standard nearest neighbors. In ATNN, we augment S by creating, for each
(x, y) ∈ S, an adversarial example xadv using the attack method in the experiment, and
adding (xadv, y). The ATNN classifier is 1-nearest neighbor on this augmented data. In
ATNN-all, for each (x, y) ∈ S, we create adversarial examples using all the attack methods
in the experiment, and add them all to S. ATNN-all is the nearest neighbor classifier on this
augmented data. For example, for white box Direct Attacks in Section 5.2, ATNN includes
adversarial examples generated by the Direct Attack, and ATNN-all includes adversarial
examples generated by both Direct and Kernel Substitute Attacks.
Observe that all algorithms except StandardNN have parameters to tune. RobustNN
has three input parameters – ∆, δ and a defense radius r which is an approximation to the
robustness radius. For simplicity, we set ∆ = 0.45, δ = 0.1 and tune r on the validation set;
this can be viewed as tuning the parameter τ in Theorem 4.2. For ATNN and ATNN-all, the
methods that generate the augmenting adversarial examples need a perturbation magnitude
r; we call this the defense radius. To be fair to all algorithms, we tune the defense radius
for each. We consider the adversary with the highest attack perturbation magnitude in the
experiment, and select the defense radius that yields the highest validation accuracy against
this adversary.
5.2 White-box Attacks and Results
To evaluate the robustness of Algorithm 1, we use two standard classes of attacks – white
box and black box. For white-box attacks, the adversary knows all details about the classifier
under attack, including its training data, the training algorithm and any hyperparameters.
5.2.1 Attack Methods
We consider two white-box attacks – direct attack [2] and Kernel Substitute Attack [24].
Direct Attack. This attack takes as input a test example x, an attack radius r, and a
training dataset S (which may be an augmented or reduced dataset). It finds an x′ ∈ S that is
closest to x but has a different label, and returns the adversarial example xadv = x+r x−x
′
||x−x′||2 .
Kernel Substitute Attack. This method attacks a substitute kernel classifier trained on
the same training set. For a test input ~x, a set of training points Z with one-hot labels Y , a
kernel classifier f predicts the class probability as:
f : ~x→
[
e−||~x−~z||
2
2/c
]
~z∈X∑
~z∈X e
−||~x−~z||22/c
· Y
The adversary trains a kernel classifier on the training set of the corresponding nearest
neighbors, and then generates adversarial examples against this kernel classifier. The
advantage is that the prediction of the kernel classifier is differentiable, which allows the
use of standard gradient-based attack methods. For our experiments, we use the popular
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fast-gradient-sign method (FSGM). The parameter c is tuned to yield the most effective
attack, and is set to 0.1 for Halfmoon and MNIST, and 0.01 for Abalone.
5.2.2 Results
Figure 1 shows the results. We see that RobustNN outperforms all baselines for Halfmoon
and Abalone for all attack radii. For MNIST, for low attack radii, RobustNN’s classification
accuracy is slightly lower than the others, while it outperforms the others for large attack
radii. Additionally, as is to be expected, the Direct Attack results in lower general accuracy
than the Kernel Substitute Attack.
These results suggest that our algorithm mostly outperforms the baselines StandardNN,
ATNN and ATNN-all. As predicted by theory, the performance gain is higher when the
training set size is large relative to the dimension – which is the setting where nearest
neighbors work well in general. It has superior performance for Halfmoon and Abalone,
where the training set size is large to medium relative to dimension. In contrast, in the
sparse dataset MNIST, our algorithm has slightly lower classification accuracy for small
attack radii, and higher otherwise.
5.3 Black-box Attacks and Results
[25] has observed that some defense methods that work by masking gradients remain highly
amenable to black box attacks. In this attack, the adversary is unaware of the target classifier’s
nature, parameters or training data, but has access to a seed dataset drawn from the same
distribution which they use to train and attack a substitute classifier. To establish robustness
properties of Algorithm 1, we therefore validate it against black box attacks based on two
types of substitute classifiers.
5.3.1 Attack Methods
We use two types of substitute classifiers – kernel classifiers and neural networks. The
adversary trains the substitute classifier using the method of [25] and uses the adversarial
examples against the substitute to attack the target classifier.
Kernel Classifier. The kernel classifier substitute is the same as the one in Section 5.2,
but trained using the seed data and the method of [25].
Neural Networks. The neural network for MNIST is the ConvNet in [23]’s tutorial. For
Halfmoon and Abalone, the network is a multi-layer perceptron with 2 hidden layers.
Procedure. To train the substitute classifier, the adversary uses the method of [24] to
augment the seed data for two rounds; labels are obtained by querying the target classifier.
Adversarial examples against the substitutes are created by FGSM, following [24]. As a
sanity check, we verify the performance of the substitute classifiers on the original training
and test sets. Details are in Table 1 in the Appendix. Sanity checks on the performance of
the substitute classifiers are presented in Table 1 in the Appendix.
5.3.2 Results
Figure 2 shows the results. For all algorithms, black box attacks are less effective than white
box, which corroborates the results of [24], who observed that black-box attacks are less
successful against nearest neighbors. We also find that the kernel substitute attack is more
effective than the neural network substitute, which is expected as kernel classifiers have
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similar structure to nearest neighbors. Finally, for Halfmoon and Abalone, our algorithm
outperforms the baselines for both attacks; however, for MNIST neural network substitute,
our algorithm does not perform as well for small attack radii. This again confirms the
theoretical predictions that our algorithm’s performance is better when the training set is
large relative to the data dimension – the setting in which nearest neighbors work well in
general.
5.4 Discussion
The results show that our algorithm performs either better than or about the same as
standard baselines against popular white box and black box attacks. As expected from
our theoretical results, it performs better for denser datasets which have high or medium
amounts of training data relative to the dimension, and either slightly worse or better for
sparser datasets, depending on the attack radius. Since non-parametric methods such as
nearest neighbors are mostly used for dense data, this suggests that our algorithm has good
robustness properties even with reasonable amounts of training data.
6 Conclusion
We introduce a novel theoretical framework for learning robust to adversarial examples, and
introduce notions of distributional and finite-sample robustness. We use these notions to
analyze a non-parametric classifier, k-nearest neighbors, and introduce a novel modified
1-nearest neighbor algorithm that has good robustness properties in the large sample limit.
Experiments show that these properties are still retained for reasonable data sizes.
Many open questions remain. The first is to close the gap in analysis of k-nearest
neighbors for k in between our two regimes. The second is to develop nearest neighbor
algorithms with better robustness guarantees. Finally, we believe that our work is a first
step towards a comprehensive analysis of how the size of training data affects robustness;
we believe that an important line of future work is to carry out similar analyses for other
supervised learning methods.
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A Proofs from Section 3
A.1 Proofs for Constant k
Proof. (Of Theorem 3.1) To show convergence in probability, we need to show that for all
, δ > 0, there exists an n(, δ) such that Pr(ρ(Ak(Sn, ·), x) ≥ ) ≤ δ for n ≥ n0(, δ).
The proof will again proceed in two stages. First, we show in Lemma A.1 that if the
conditions in the statement of Theorem 3.1 hold, then there exists some n(, δ) such that
for n ≥ n(, δ), with probability at least 1− δ, there exists two points x+ and x− in B(x, )
such that (a) all k nearest neighbors of x+ have label 1, (b) all k nearest neighbors of x−
have label 0, and (c) x+ 6= x−.
Next we show that if the event stated above happens, then ρ(Ak(Sn, ·), x) ≤ . This is
because Ak(Sn, x+) = 1 and Ak(Sn, x−) = 0. No matter what Ak(Sn, x) is, we can always
find a point x′ that lies in {x+, x−} ⊂ B(x, ) such that the prediction at x′ is different from
Ak(Sn, x).
Lemma A.1. If the conditions in the statement of Theorem 3.1 hold, then there exists
some n(, δ) such that for n ≥ n(, δ), with probability at least 1− δ, there are two points x+
and x− in B(x, ) such that (a) all k nearest neighbors of x+ have label 1, (b) all k nearest
neighbors of x− have label 0, and (c) x+ 6= x−.
Proof. (Of Lemma A.1) The proof consists of two major components. First, for large enough
n, with high probability there are many disjoint balls in the neighborhood of x such that
each ball contains at least k points in Sn. Second, with high probability among these balls,
there exists a ball such that the k neareast neighbors of its center all have label 1. Similarly,
there exists a ball such that the k nearest neighbor of its center all have label 0.
Since µ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure in the neighbor-
bood of x and η is continuous, then for any m ∈ Z+, we can always find m balls
B(x1, r1), · · · , B(xm, rm) such that (a) all m balls are disjoint, and (b) for all i ∈ {1, · · · ,m},
we have xi ∈ B(x, ), µ(B(xi, ri)) > 0 and η(x) ∈ (0, 1) for x ∈ B(xi, ri). For simplicity, we
use Bi to denote B(xi, ri) and ci(n) to denote the number of points in Bi
⋂
Sn. Also, let
µmin = mini∈{1,··· ,m} µ(Bi). Then by Hoeffding’s inequality, for each ball Bi and for any
n > k+1µmin ,
Pr[ci(n) < k] ≤ exp(−2nµ2min/(k + 1)2),
where the randomness comes from drawing sample Sn. Then taking the union bound over
all m balls, we have
Pr[∃i ∈ {1, · · · ,m} such that ci(n) < k] ≤ m exp(−2nµ2min/(k + 1)2), (2)
which implies that when n > max
(
k+1
µmin
, [logm−log(δ/3)](k+1)
2
µ2min
)
, with probability at least
1− δ/3, each of B1, · · · , Bm contains at least k points in Sn.
An important consequence of the above result is that with probability at least 1− δ/3,
the set of k nearest neighbors of each center xi of Bi is completely different from another
center xj ’s, so the labels of xi’s k nearest neighbors are independent of the labels of xj ’s k
nearest neighbors.
Now let ηmin,+ = minx∈B1⋃···⋃Bm η(x) and ηmin,− = minx∈B1⋃···⋃Bm(1− η(x)). Both
ηmin,+ and ηmin,− are greater than 0 by the construction requirements of B1, · · · , Bm. For
any xi,
Pr[xi’s k nearest neighbors all have label 1] ≥ ηkmin,+
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Then,
Pr[∃i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}s.t. xi’s k nearest neighbor all have label 1] ≥ 1− (1− ηkmin,+)m, (3)
which implies when m ≥ log δ/3
log(1−ηkmin,+)
, with probability at least 1− δ/3, there exists an xi
s.t. its k nearest neighbors all have label 1. This xi is our x+.
Similarly,
Pr[∃i ∈ {1, · · · ,m} s.t. xi’s k nearest neighbor all have label 0] ≥ 1− (1− ηkmin,−)m, (4)
and when m ≥ log δ/3
log(1−ηkmin,−)
, with probability at least 1− δ/3, there exists an xi s.t. its k
nearest neighbors all have label 0. This xi is our x−.
Combining the results above, we show that for
n > max
(
k + 1
µmin
,
[logm− log(δ/3)](k + 1)2
µ2min
)
,
m ≥ max
(
log δ/3
log(1− ηkmin,+)
,
log δ/3
log(1− ηkmin,−)
)
,
with probability at least 1− δ, the statement in Lemma A.1 is satisfied.
A.2 Theorem and proof for k-nn robustness lower bound.
Theorem 3.1 shows that k-NN is inherently non-robust in the low k regime if η(x) ∈ (0, 1). On
the contrary, k-NN can be robust at x if η(x) ∈ {0, 1}. We define the r-robust (p,∆)-interior
as follows:
Xˆ+r,∆,p = {x ∈ supp(µ)|∀x′ ∈ Bo(x, r),
∀x′′ ∈ B(x′, rp(x′)), η(x′′) ≥ 1/2 + ∆}
Xˆ−r,∆,p = {x ∈ supp(µ)|∀x′ ∈ Bo(x, r),
∀x′′ ∈ B(x′, rp(x′)), η(x′′) ≤ 1/2−∆}
The definition is similar to the strict r-robust (p,∆)-interior in Section 4, except replacing <
and > with ≤ and ≥. Theorem A.2 show that k-NN is robust at radius r in the r-robust
(1/2, p)-interior with high high probability. Corollary A.3 shows the finite sample rate of the
robustness lowerbound.
Theorem A.2. Let x ∈ X ∩ supp(µ) such that (a) µ is absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure (b) η(x) ∈ {0, 1}. Then, for fixed k, there exists an n0 such that for
n ≥ n0,
Pr[ρ(Ak(Sn, ·), x) ≥ r] ≥ 1− δ
for all x in Xˆ+r,1/2,p
⋃ Xˆ−r,1/2,p for all p > 0, δ > 0.
In addition, with probability at least 1− δ, the astuteness of the k-NN classifier is at least:
E(1(X ∈ Xˆ+r,1/2,p
⋃
Xˆ−r,1/2,p))
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Proof. The k-NN classifier Ak(Sn, ·) is robust at radius r at x if for every x′ ∈ Bo(x, r), a)
there are k training points in B(x′, rp(x′)), and b) more than bk/2c of them have the same
label as Ak(Sn, x). Without loss of generality, we look at a point x ∈ Xˆ+r,1/2,p. The second
condition is satisfied since η(x) = 1 for all training points in B(x′, rp(x′)) by the definition
of Xˆ+r,1/2,p.
It remains to check the first condition. Let B be a ball in Rd and n(B) be the number of
training points in B. Lemma 16 of [4] suggests that with probability at least 1− δ, for all B
in Rd,
µ(B) ≥ k
n
+
Co
n
(
d log n+ log
1
δ
+
√
k
(
d log n+ log
1
δ
))
(5)
implies n(B) ≥ k, where Co is a constant term. Let B = B(x′, rp(x′)). By the definition of
rp, µ(B) ≥ p > 0. Then as n→∞, Inequality 5 will eventually be satisfied, which implies B
contains at least k training points. The first condition is then met.
The astuteness result follows because Ak(Sn, x) = y = 1 in Xˆ+r,1/2,p and Ak(Sn, x) = y = 0
in Xˆ−r,1/2,p with probability 1.
Corollary A.3. For n ≥ max(104, c4d,k,δ/[(k + 1)2p2]) where
cd,k,δ = 4(d+ 1) +
√
16(d+ 1)2 + 8(ln(8/δ) + k + 1)
, with probability at least 1− 2δ, ρ(Ak(Sn, x)) ≥ r for all x in Xˆ+r,1/2,p
⋃ Xˆ−r,1/2,p and for all
p > 0, δ > 0.
In addition, with probability at least 1 − 2δ, the astuteness of the k-NN classifier is at
least:
E(1(X ∈ Xˆ+r,1/2,p
⋃
Xˆ−r,1/2,p))
Proof. Without loss of generality, we look at a point x ∈ Xˆ+r,1/2,p. Let B = B(x′, rp(x′)),
J(B) = E(Y · 1(X ∈ B)) and Jˆ(B) be the empirical estimation of J(B). Notice that Jˆ(B)n
is the number of training points in B, because η(x) = 1 for all x ∈ B by the definition of
r-robust (1/2, p)-interior. It remains to find a threshold n such that for all n′ > n,
Jˆ(B) ≥ (k + 1)/n′ (6)
By Lemma A.5, with probability 1− 2δ,
Jˆ(B) ≥ p− 2βn√p− 2β2n (7)
for all B ∈ Rd.
Therefore it suffices to find a threshold n that satisfies
p− 2βn√p− 2β2n ≥ (k + 1)/n, (8)
where βn =
√
(4/n)((d+ 1) ln 2n+ ln(8/δ)).
Solving this quadratic inequality yields
βn ≤
−√p+√3p+ (k + 1)/n
2
, (9)
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which can be re-written as
(8/
√
n)[(d+ 1) ln(2n) + ln(8/δ) + (k + 1)/8] ≤
√
(k + 1)p (10)
by substituting the expression for βn. This inequality does not admit an analytic solution.
Nevertheless, we observe that n1/4 ≥ ln(2n) for all n ≥ 104. Therefore it suffices to find an
n ≥ 104 such that
(8/
√
n)[(d+ 1)n1/4 + ln(8/δ) + (k + 1)/8] ≤
√
(k + 1)p. (11)
Let m = n1/4. Inequality 11 can be re-written as√
(k + 1)pm2 − 8(d+ 1)m− (8 ln(8/δ) + (k + 1)) ≥ 0. (12)
Solving this quadratic inequality with respct to m gives
m ≥ 4(d+ 1) +
√
16(d+ 1)2 + 8(ln(8/δ) + k + 1)√
(k + 1)p
. (13)
Letting
cd,k,δ = 4(d+ 1) +
√
16(d+ 1)2 + 8(ln(8/δ) + k + 1)
, we find a desired threshold
n = max(104,m4) ≥ max(104, c4d,k,δ/[(k + 1)2p2]). (14)
The astuteness result follows in a similar way to Theorem A.2.
A.3 Proofs for High k
A.3.1 Robustness of the Bayes Optimal Classifier
Proof. (Of Theorem 3.2) Suppose x ∈ X+r,0,0. Then, g(x) = 1. Consider any x′ ∈ Bo(x, r);
by definition, η(x′) > 1/2, which implies that g(x′) = 1 as well. Thus, ρ(g, x) ≥ r. The other
case (x ∈ X−r,0,0) is symmetric.
Consider an x ∈ X+r,0,0 (the other case is symmetric). We just showed that g has
robustness radius ≥ r at x. Moreover, p(y = 1 = g(x)|x) = η(x); therefore, g predicts the
correct label at x with probability η(x). The theorem follows by integrating over all x in
X+r,0,0 ∪ X−r,0,0.
A.3.2 Robustness of k-Nearest Neighbor
We begin by stating and proving a more technical version of Theorem 3.3.
Theorem A.4. For any n and data dimension d, define:
an =
C0
n
(d log n+ log(1/δ))
bn = C0
√
d log n+ log(1/δ)
n
βn =
√
(4/n)((d+ 1) ln 2n+ ln(8/δ))
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where C0 is the constant in Theorem 15 of [4]. Now, pick kn and ∆n so that ∆n → 0 and
the following condition is satisfied:
kn
n
≥ 2βn + bn +
√
(2βn + bn)2 + 2∆n(2β2n + an)
∆n
and set
pn =
kn
n
+
C0
n
(
d log n+ log(1/δ)
+
√
kn(d log n+ log(1/δ)
)
Then, with probability ≥ 1 − 3δ, kn-NN has robustness radius r at all x ∈ X+r,∆n,pn ∪
X−r,∆n,pn . In addition, with probability ≥ 1− δ, the astuteness of kn-NN is at least:
E[η(X) · 1(X ∈ X+r,∆n,pn)] + E(1− η(X)) · 1(X ∈ X−r,∆n,pn)]
Before we prove Theorem A.4, we need some definitions and lemmas.
For any Euclidean ball B in Rd, define J(B) = E[Y · 1(X ∈ B)] and Jˆ(B) as the
corresponding empirical quantity.
Lemma A.5. With probability ≥ 1− 2δ, for all balls B in Rd, we have:
|J(B)− Jˆ(B)| ≤ 2β2n + 2βn min(
√
J(B),
√
Jˆ(B)),
where βn =
√
(4/n)((d+ 1) ln 2n+ ln(8/δ)).
Proof. (Of Lemma A.5) Consider the two functions: h+B(x, y) = 1(y = 1, x ∈ B) and
h−B(x, y) = 1(y = −1, x ∈ B). From Lemma A.6, both h+B and h−B are 0/1 functions with
VC dimension at most d+ 1. Additionally, J(B) = E[h+B]− E[h−B]. Applying Theorem 15
of [4], along with an union bound gives the lemma.
Lemma A.6. For an Euclidean ball B in Rd, define the function h+B : Rd×{−1,+1} → {0, 1}
as:
h+B(x, y) = 1(y = 1, x ∈ B)
and let HB = {h+B} be the class of all such functions. Then the VC-dimension of HB is at
most d+ 1.
Proof. (Of Lemma A.6) Let U be a set of d+ 2 points in Rd; as the VC dimension of balls
in Rd is d+ 1, U cannot be shattered by balls in Rd. Let UL = {(x, y)|x ∈ U} be a labeling
of U that cannot be achieved by any ball (with pluses inside and minuses outside); the
corresponding d + 1-dimensional points cannot be labeled accordingly by h+B. Since U is
an arbitrary set of d+ 2 points, this implies that any set of d+ 2 points in Rd × {−1,+1}
cannot be shattered by HB . The lemma follows.
Lemma A.7. Let δp = C0n
(
d log n+ log(1/δ) +
√
k(d log n+ log(1/δ)
)
. Then, with proba-
bility ≥ 1−δ, for all x, ‖x−X(k+1)(x)‖ ≤ rk/n+δp(x), and µ(B(x, ‖x−X(k+1)(x)‖)) ≥ kn−δp.
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Figure. 3: Visualization of the halfmoon dataset. 1) Training sample of size n = 2000,
2) subset selected by Robust_1NN with defense radius r = 0.1, 3) subset selected by
Robust_1NN with defense radius r = 0.2.
Proof. (Of Lemma A.7) Observe that by definition for any x, rp is the smallest r such that
µ(B(x, rp(x)) ≥ p. The rest of the proof follows from Lemma 16 of [4].
Proof. (Of Theorem A.4)
From Lemma A.7, by uniform convergence of µˆ, with probability ≥ 1 − δ, for all x′,
‖x′ − X(kn)(x′)‖ ≤ rpn(x′) and µ(B(x, ‖x − X(kn)(x)‖)) ≥ knn − δp. If x′ ∈ X+r,∆n,pn ,
this implies that for all x˜ ∈ B(x′, X(kn)(x′)), η(x˜) ≥ 1/2 + ∆. Therefore, for such an
x′, J(B(x′, X(kn)(x′))) ≥ ( 12 + ∆n)µ(B(x′, X(kn)(x′))) ≥ ( 12 + ∆n)(kn/n − δp). Since for
B(x′, X(kn)(x′)), µˆ(B(x′, X(kn)(x′))) = knn , min(Jˆ , J) ≤ kn . Thus we can apply Lemma A.5
to conclude that
Jˆ(B) > J(B)− 2β2n − 2βn
√
kn/n >
kn
2n
,
which implies that Yˆ (B) = 1kn
∑kn
i=1 Y
(i)(x) = nkn Jˆ(B) >
1
2 . The first part of the theorem
follows.
For the second part, observe that for an x ∈ X+r,∆n,pn , the label Y is equal to +1 with
probability η(x) and for an x ∈ X−r,∆n,pn , the label Y is equal to −1 with probability 1−η(x).
Combining this with the first part completes the proof.
B Proofs from Section 4
We begin with a statement of Chernoff Bounds that we use in our calculations.
Theorem B.1. [21] Let Xi be a 0/1 random variable and let X =
∑m
i=1Xi. Then,
Pr(|X − E[X]| ≥ δ) ≤ e−mδ2/2 + e−mδ2/3 ≤ 2e−mδ2/3
Lemma B.2. Suppose we run Algorithm 1 with parameter r. Then, the points marked as
red by the algorithm form an r-separated subset of the training set.
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Figure. 4: Adversarial examples of MNIST digit 1 images created by different attack methods.
Top row: clean digit 1 test images. Middle row from left to right: 1) direct attack, 2)
white-box kernel attack. Bottom row from left to right: 1) black-box kernel attack, 2)
black-box neural net substitute attack.
Proof. Let f(xi) denote the output of Algorithm 2 on xi. If (xi, 1) is a Red point, then
f(xi) = 1 = f(xj) for all xj ∈ B(x, r); therefore, (xj ,−1) cannot be marked as Red by the
algorithm as f(xj) 6= yj . The other case, where (xi,−1) is a Red point is similar.
Lemma B.3. Let x ∈ X such that Algorithm 1 finds a Red xi within Bo(x, τ). Then,
Algorithm 1 has robustness radius at least r − 2τ at x.
Proof. For all x′ ∈ B(x, τ), we have:
‖x′ − xi‖ ≤ ‖x− xi‖+ ‖x− x′‖ < 2τ
Since xi is a Red point, from Lemma B.2, any xj in training set output by Algorithm 1 with
yj 6= yi must have the property that ‖xi − xj‖ > r. Therefore,
‖x′ − xj‖ ≥ ‖xi − xj‖ − ‖x′ − xi‖ > r − 2τ
Therefore, Algorithm 1 will assign x′ the label yi. The lemma follows.
Lemma B.4. Let B be a ball such that: (a) for all x ∈ B, η(x) > 12 + ∆ and (b)
µ(B) ≥ 2C0n (d log n+ log(1/δ)). Then, with probability ≥ 1− δ, all such balls have at least
one xi such that xi ∈ |B ∩Xn| and yi = 1.
Proof. Observe that J(B) ≥ C0n (d log n+ log(1/δ)). Applying Theorem 16 of [4], this implies
that Jˆ(B) > 0, which gives the theorem.
Lemma B.5. Fix ∆ and δ, and let kn =
3 log(2n/δ)
∆2 . Additionally, let
pn =
kn
n
+
C0
n
(d log n+ log(1/δ) +
√
kn(d log n+ log(1/δ)),
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Table 1: An evaluation of the black-box substitute classifier. Each black-box substitute is
evaluated by: 1) its accuracy on the its training set, 2) its accuracy on the test set, and 3) the
percentage of predictions agreeing with the target classifier on the test set. A combination of
high test accuracy and consistency with the original classifier indicates the black-box model
emulates the target classifier well.
Abalone
target f % training % test % testf
accuracy accuracy same as f
Kernel
StandardNN 100% 61.3% 72.6%
RobustNN 100% 62.5% 90.9%
ATNN 100% 61.4% 73.7%
ATNN-All 100% 63.5% 73.5%
Neural
Nets
StandardNN 69.1% 68.9% 68.6%
RobustNN 87.2% 64.1% 86.9%
ATNN 68.8% 68.4% 68.4%
ATNN-All 66.5% 65.0% 66.6%
Halfmoon
target f % training % test % test
accuracy accuracy same as f
Kernel
StandardNN 95.9% 95.6% 95.5%
RobustNN 97.7% 94.9% 97.6%
ATNN 96.4% 95.1% 96.0%
ATNN-All 97.6% 96.8% 97.3%
Neural
Nets
StandardNN 94.5% 94.0% 94.4%
RobustNN 94.2% 90.5% 94.1%
ATNN 95.3% 94.2% 95.2%
ATNN-All 96.9% 96.2% 96.5%
MNIST 1v7
target f % training % test % test
accuracy accuracy same as f
Kernel
StandardNN 100% 98.9% 99.3%
RobustNN 100% 95.4% 97.6%
ATNN 100% 98.9% 99.3%
ATNN-All 100% 98.7% 99.3%
Neural
Nets
StandardNN 99.9% 98.9% 99.1%
RobustNN 99.8% 94.8% 98.7%
ATNN 100% 98.8% 99.2%
ATNN-All 99.7% 98.9% 99.3%
where C0 is the constant in Theorem 15 of [4]. Define:
SRED = {(xi, yi) ∈ Sn|xi ∈ X+r,∆,pn ∪ X−r,∆,p,
yi =
1
2
sgn
(
η(xi)− 1
2
)
+
1
2
}
Then, with probability ≥ 1− δ, all (xi, yi) ∈ SRED are marked as Red by Algorithm 1 run
with parameters r, ∆ and δ.
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Proof. Consider a (xi, yi) ∈ SRED such that xi ∈ Xn∩X+r,∆,pn , and consider any (xj , yj) ∈ Sn
such that xj ∈ B(xi, r). From Lemma A.7, for all such xj , ‖xj −X(kn)(xj)‖ ≤ rpn(xj); this
means that all kn-nearest neighbors x′′ of such an xj have η(x′′) > 12 + ∆.
Therefore, E[
∑kn
l=1 Y
(l)(xj)] ≥ kn(1/2 + ∆); by Theorem B.1, this means that for a
specific xj , Pr(
∑kn
l=1 Y
(l)(xj) < 1/2) ≤ 2e−kn∆2/3, which is ≤ δ/n from our choice of kn.
By an union bound over all such xj , with probability ≥ 1 − δ, we see that Algorithm 2
reports the label g(xi) on all such xi, which is the same as yi by the definition of interiors;
xi therefore gets marked as Red.
Finally, we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section, which is a slightly more
technical form of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem B.6. Fix a ∆n, and pick kn and pn as in Lemma B.5. Suppose we run Algorithm 1
with parameters r, ∆n and δ. Consider the set:
XR =
{
x
∣∣∣x ∈ X+r+τ,∆n,pn ∪ X−r+τ,∆n,pn ,
µ(B(x, τ)) ≥ 2C0
n
(d log n+ log(1/δ))
}
,
where C0 is the constant in Theorem 15 of [4]. Then, with probability ≥ 1 − 2δ over the
training set, Algorithm 1 has robustness radius ≥ r − 2τ on XR. Additionally, its astuteness
at radius r− 2τ is at least E[η(X) · 1(X ∈ X+r+τ,∆n,pn)] +E[(1− η(X)) · 1(X ∈ X−r+τ,∆n,pn)].
Proof. Due to the condition on µ(B(x, τ)), from Lemma B.4, with probability ≥ 1− δ, all
x ∈ XR have the property that there exists a (xi, yi) in Sn such that yi = g(xi) and xi ∈
B(x, τ). Without loss of generality, suppose that x ∈ X+r+τ,∆n,pn , so that η(x) > 1/2 + ∆n.
Then, from the properties of r-robust interiors, this xi ∈ X+r,∆n,pn .
From Lemma B.5, with probability ≥ 1− δ, this (xi, yi) is marked Red by Algorithm 1
run with parameters r, ∆n and δ. The theorem now follows from an union bound and
Lemma B.3.
C Experiment Visualization and Validation
First, we show adversarial examples created by different attacks on the MNIST dataset in
order to illustrate characteristics of each attack. Next, we show the subset of training points
selected by Algorithm 1 on the halfmoon dataset. The visualization illustrates the intuition
behind Algorithm 1 and also validates its implementation. Finally, we validate how effective
the black-box subsitute classifiers emulate the target classifier.
C.1 Adversarial Examples Created by Different Attacks
Figure 4 shows adversarial examples created on MNIST digit 1 images with attack radius
r = 3. First, we observe that the perturbations added by direct attack, white-box kernel
attack and black-box kernel attack are clearly targeted: either a faint horizontal stroke or a
shadow of digit 7 are added to the original image. The perturbation budget is used on "key"
pixels that distinguish digit 1 and digit 7, therefore the attack is effective. On the contrary,
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black-box attacks with neural nets substitute adds perturbation to a large number of pixels.
While such perturbation often fools a neural net classifier, it is not effective against nearest
neighbors. Consider a pixel that is dark in most digit 1 and digit 7 training images; adding
brightness to this pixel increases the distance between the test image to training images from
both classes, therefore may not change the nearest neighbor to the test image.
Figure 4 also illustrates the break-down attack radius of visual similarity. At r = 3,
the true class of adversarial examples created by effective attacks becomes ambiguous even
to humans. Our defense is successful as the Robust_1NN classifiers still have non-trivial
classification accuracy at such attack radius. Meanwhile, we should not expect robustness
against even larger attack radius since the adversarial examples at r = 3 are already close to
the boundary of human perception.
C.2 Training Subset Selected by Robust_1NN
Figure 3 shows the training set selected by Robust_1NN on a halfmoon training set of size
2000. On the original training set, we see a noisy region between the two halfmoons where
both red and blue points appear. Robust_1NN cleans training points in this region so as to
create a gap between the red and blue halfmoons, and the gap width increases with defense
radius r.
C.3 Performance of Black-box Attack Substitutes
We validate the black-box substitute training process by checking the substitute’s accuracy
on its training set, the clean test set and the percentage of predictions agreeing with the
target classifier on the clean test set. The results are shown in Table 1. For the halfmoon and
MNIST dataset, the substitute classifiers both achieve high accuracy on both the training
and test sets, and are also consistent with the target classifier on the test set. The subsitutute
classifiers do not emulate the target classifier on the Abalone dataset as close as on the other
two datasets due to the high noise level in the Abalone dataset. Nonetheless, the substitute
classifier still achieve test time accuracy comparable to the target classifier.
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